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30 OCT 1972

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Chief, Plans Staff, DDS

SUBJECT : DCID Papers

1. The following comments are in response to your request of 25 October 1972.

2. We have reviewed and have no comments to make on the following DCID's.

1/6/1	Production and Coordination of Foreign Economic Intelligence
1/8/1	Production of Intelligence on Foreign Atomic Energy Matters
1/9/1	Production and Coordination of Intelligence on Foreign Missile and Space Systems
2/1/1	Monitoring and Exploitation of Foreign Public Information Media
2/2/1	Procurement of Foreign Publications

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Coordination of Certain Types of
Overt Foreign Intelligence Activities

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3. The following are comments on the drafts of DCID 1/7.

There are three drafts of the DCID 1/7:

- (a) SA Draft dated 20 October 1972
- (b) OGC Draft dated 24 October 1972
- (c) DDP Draft dated 27 September 1972

Unauthorized Disclosures

The DDP and OGC drafts call upon USIB departments and agencies to investigate any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or intelligence sources and methods and submit such report to the DCI, including corrective action to be taken or recommended, and, as appropriate, to the National Security Council or the President.

The new draft DCID 1/17, "Coordination of Maintenance of Security" (Security Committee functions) explicitly states that the Security Committee will take similar action with regard to unauthorized disclosures and submit reports (includes investigations by USIB agencies, assessments, corrective actions, recommendations) to the DCI through USIB.

The SA and OGC drafts by-passes the Security Committee and will render it ineffective in the performance of one of its major functions. Consequently, the new DCID 1/7 should not contain this requirement.

Definition of Intelligence

A clarification should be made in the definition of intelligence. The DDP draft covers everything that comes to the

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knowledge of the U.S. Government which is used for intelligence purposes. This would require the marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved". OGC draft would apply the marking to sensitive intelligence only. We prefer the OGC definition of intelligence.

Other Comments

We believe the need-to-know principle and security clearances should not be rehashed in this directive.

4. The memoranda on the SSC offer some concern.

(a) Repetitive reference is made to the 11 July draft of the DCID/SSC with reference that Mr. Proctor and Mr. Duckett accepted this version. However, we note that the DDI offered an alternative to the 11 July draft. Further, neither memorandum mentions the DDS objections to the concept of a DCID/SSC. No mention is made of the DDS objection to the 11 July draft or of the fact that the DDS submitted an alternative. We believe that reference to any specific version of a DCID should be eliminated from the memos.

(b) We have no objection to the compilation of a proposed manual. If appropriate after completion of the manual the content of a DCID/SSC should be addressed.

(c) We do not understand [] statements that 1/14 and 1/16 will require revision if a new SSC is not established. It appears to us that the need for a statement of Uniform Personnel Security Standards (1/14) and Security of Compartmented Computer Operations (1/16) continues with or without a new SSC.

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5. We would be pleased to meet with you to answer any further questions.

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Acting Director of Security

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